Other experts share a similar perspective to Korpe.
“If you’re going to take the Strait of Hormuz back, you’re going to have to control an over 100-mile stretch by 20 miles deep into Iran… That would be 100,000+ troops just for this footprint… We don’t have the troops to occupy Iran,” Robert A. Pape, who is also a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, said in a recent interview.
How ground operation proceed
Although Trump proposes ending the war in two to three weeks, ongoing military deployments to the Gulf suggest the US is exploring a possible ground offensive targeting Iranian islands, the Strait of Hormuz, and possibly mainland Iran, as experts indicate.
The only measure of the evolution of a limited conflict into a comprehensive war is the real intention of ‘Operation Epic Fury’, which remains unclear, warns Korpe.
But “as a tactical signal”, when a clash on Iranian islands in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz begins between US and Iranian land/sea/air operational/tactical level units conducting open operations, it can be said that “the ground operation has begun,” he says.
The US could target various locations in the Gulf, starting from Kharg Island, which manages 90 percent of Tehran’s oil, to three smaller islands—Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb—near the strategic strait.
Alternatively, it might undertake a more risky ground operation across mainland Iran to confiscate enriched uranium from Isfahan and other sites.
Eslami, a political scientist at the European University Institute, doubts that the US will really target Kharg Island because it is very far from the Strait of Hormuz.
“Taking Kharg doesn’t help opening Hormuz. Even if they take it, it is impossible to hold it,” the professor tells TRT World.
But the other three islands, which have long been disputed between Iran and the UAE, lie off Hormuz, which might be the most likely targets of a possible US ground offensive.
Abu Dhabi has recently indicated that it can also contribute to this military action.
“If the US takes it and hands it over to the UAE, they might be able to control it,” says Eslami.
Amphibious operation?
In addition to possible strikes on islands in the Gulf, analysts say the United States could employ a range of unconventional tactics, including arming paramilitary groups within Iran to destabilise the government or pursuing a risky amphibious landing on Iranian territory.
Such scenarios, while difficult to execute, remain part of broader military contingency planning.
If the US operation were to escalate to ground assault, whether aimed at Iranian islands or the mainland, they would likely fall under what the American military doctrine defines as Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO).
This doctrine defines operations such as “seizing and holding a lodgement in the face of armed opposition,” which involve establishing a secure foothold that enables the continuous arrival of troops, equipment, and supplies.
A lodgment, in military terms, is a critical zone inside hostile territory that enables continuous troop deployment and creates operational space for further manoeuvres.
However, executing such operations is among the most complex and resource-intensive forms of warfare.
“While JFEO is among the most difficult military undertakings, an amphibious operation is its most intense and hardest part,” Korpe says.
Given current force deployments, Korpe argues that Washington lacks the scale of personnel and logistical preparation required for a full-scale preparation and amphibious assault against Iranian islands or mainland territory.
Under conventional wisdom, he says, such a military offensive would typically be avoided.
Korpe emphasises that deception planning is also as vital as any forced-entry operation. It is a fundamental military strategy aimed at misleading an adversary about the timing, location, or scale of an attack.
These plans can involve feints, misinformation campaigns, or simulated troop movements designed to divert enemy forces and lessen resistance at the actual point of entry.
“A forced entry operation must necessarily include a comprehensive deception plan, because ‘all warfare relies on deception’,” he says.
However, Korpe argues that signs of strategic inconsistency are already visible, with mixed messaging from Washington fuelling speculation rather than confusion among the adversaries.
This uncertainty has led to widespread speculation within Iran about various possible scenarios, including attacks on strategic islands near the Strait of Hormuz, a direct invasion of the mainland, or airborne strikes aimed at nuclear facilities and leadership sites, the analyst says.